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Abstract: This paper argues that four analytical levels may be found in social sciences, 
including economics –namely, a) a statistical descriptive level, b) a causal explanatory level, c) 
a teleological explicative level, and d) a prescriptive teleological level. Typically, social 
sciences only consider levels a) and b). The exclusion of level c) may lead to viewing 
behaviors that do not respect theories like the rational choice theory or the expected utility 
theory –theories which adopt “instrumental rationality”—as “anomalies”. Including level c) 
entails considering “practical rationality” and makes those anomalies reasonable. The paper 
adopts Aristotle’s causality notion and teleology as a theoretical framework. The first section 
introduces these notions, while the second section explores contemporary views on causality 
and teleology. These discussions pave the way for the introduction of the afore-mentioned 
four analytical levels. Specifically, in the case of economics, this discussion is based on Carl 
Menger’s classification of economic disciplines.  
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Causality and explanation are hot topics in the contemporary philosophy of natural and social 
sciences. The dissatisfaction with some “classical” accounts of scientific explanation (such as 
the deductive-nomological or covering law model, or the inductive and deductive statistical 
explanation) leads philosophers of science to probe the possibilities of causal explanations. 
However, instead of unanimous notions on causation and explanation, a plethora of concepts 
emerged.2 This paper argues that four analytical levels may be found in social sciences, 
including economics –namely, a) a statistical descriptive level, b) a causal explanatory level, c) 
a teleological explicative level and d) a prescriptive teleological level. Social sciences 
ordinarily only consider levels a) and b). The exclusion of level c) may lead to viewing 
behaviors that do not respect theories such as the rational choice theory or the expected 
utility theory –theories which adopt “instrumental rationality”— as “anomalies”. Including 
level c) entails factoring “practical rationality” in and makes those anomalies reasonable. Once 
level c) is included, level d) “automatically” applies. For reasons that will become clear as this 
paper unfolds, this analysis adopts Aristotle’s notions on causality, teleology and practical 
reason as a theoretical framework. For the sake of the proposal outlined here, it is convenient 
to preserve Aristotle’s notions in their original form, avoiding the changes introduced in 
modern times. The first section introduces the Aristotelian notions of causality and teleology, 
while the second section explores contemporary views on them. The third section discusses 
the four analytical levels of social sciences, relying on Carl Menger’s classification of economic 
disciplines in the case of economics.  
 
1. Aristotle’s Views on Causality and Explanation   
For Aristotle, explanation is based on causes; causes are really existent, and the ontological 
and explicative priority within them belongs to the cause ‘for the sake of which’, later called 
“final cause”. In Metaphysics (I, 3-7), Aristotle reviewed the earlier Greek tradition on the 
nature of investigations into any reality or event, which focused on a search for underlying 
causes. Proper knowledge hinges on knowing the causes or why something happens. He then 
elaborated on his stance on causality (Physics II, 3 and 7; Metaphysics I, 10 and V, 5): “a 
doctrine of four becauses” (J. L. Ackrill 1981, p. 36), finding answers to these questions: what 
is this made of? Why is this this thing and not another? Who made it? And for the sake of what 
                                                 
2 Sosa and Tooley’s (1993) compilation is classical. See also Scheines (2004). Pluralist views on causa-
tion have been sustained in social sciences. See a review in Reiss 2009, pp. 21-26. See also Sthatis Psil-
los 2009.  
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is this made? (later respectively called material, formal, efficient and final causes, 
respectively.) Aristotle introduced this doctrine in Physics (II, 3 194b 16-35; see also 
Metaphysics I, 3, 983a 26-33):  
In one sense, then, (1) that out of which a thing comes to be and persists is called 
´cause’—e.g., the bronze of the statue (…). In another sense (2) the form or the 
archetype, i.e., the statement of the essence, and its genera, are called ‘causes’ (…). 
Again (3), the primary source of change or coming to rest; e.g., the man who gave 
advice is a cause, the father is the cause of the child (…). Again (4) in the sense of end 
or ‘that for the sake of which’ a thing is done (…) 
This last cause is a telos (perfection), and Aristotle views it as the primary cause: “First is 
evidently the one we call for the sake of something” (Parts of Animals I, 639b 14). The final 
cause is ontologically –though not chronologically– prior to the efficient cause and compatible 
with it: the final cause triggers the action of the efficient cause. As Aristotle states, “generation 
is for the sake of substance, not substance for the sake of generation” (Parts of Animals I, 640a 
18-19). Without an end, there is no action in either the natural or human realms. Aristotle 
asserts: “Nature does nothing in vain. For all things that exist by nature, exist for an end” (On 
the Soul II, 12, 434a 31-33).  
Final cause also comes first in an explanation. Johnson (2005, p. 167) explains, “the cause for 
the sake of which is not an efficient cause […] [it] provides the explanation of the end-oriented 
activity which necessitates ‘efficient causal’ (moving and material) processes.” Aristotle 
argues that the final cause must be determined firstly (Parts of Animals I, 639b 11-21). 
Johnson (2005, p. 180) elaborates, “an explanation of a natural kind has to specify not just, 
and not first, the capacities, but rather the activities and that for the sake of which the 
capacities exist and become active.”3 For Aristotle, “explanation cannot even begin until the 
for the sake of which has been identified […] To put it into ontological terms: were there no 
for the sake of which, there would be no powers, potentials, or mechanisms” (Johnson 2005, 
pp. 185 and 186; see also Falcon 2012, pp. 7-9). Consequently, the teleological explanation is 
the ultimate explanation, and it is necessary for a full explanation.  
Nonetheless, while Aristotle regards the final cause of an event as the “primary” (Metaphysics 
I, 3 983a 25-26) cause and explanation, he also considers the possibility of an event with no 
final cause: in this case, the primary cause is efficient, amounting to its explanation 
(Metaphysics VIII, 4, 1044b 13-15 –he uses an eclipse as example).4  
Aristotle’s thinking on explanation and causes is also flexible, as he considers several degrees 
of necessity/contingency and universality/particularity in the explanation by causes, 
depending on the reality to be explained –“generic effects should be assigned to generic 
causes, particular effects to particular causes” (Physics II, 3, 195b 25-26)– and on explainers’ 
concerns (Physics II, 2, 194a 36 - b7; Sorabji 1980 pp. 58-59). Additionally, one or a 
combination of all four kinds of causes may be more appropriate, also depending on the event 
to be explained. However, as noted earlier, the “primary cause” (Physics II, 2, 194a 20; 
Metaphysics I, 3, 983a 25-16) –the final cause– remains the priority. This cause is intimately 
related to the formal cause, because the nature or essence (formal cause) of something 
pertains to its end (final cause). Such, for example, is the case of the ergon (function) 
                                                 
3 According to G. H. von Wright, for Aristotle (as well as for Hegel), “explanation consists in making 
phenomena teleologically intelligible rather than predictable from knowledge of their efficient causes” 
(1971, p. 8).  
4 G. H. von Wright (1971, p. 170) states: “Although there is a strong emphasis on teleology in Aristotle 
and in “Aristotelian” science, by no means all explanations characteristic of their way of thinking are 
teleological.” 
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argument to determine the definition of eudaimonia in Nicomachean Ethics (I, 7; see Johnson 
2005, pp. 218-22; Reeve 1995, pp. 123-4).  
Aristotle’s emphasis on looking for causes to make an explanation does not mean that he did 
not take into account other purposes of science. Depending on the subject, he stressed the 
relevance of data collection, the usefulness of predictions, and the normative –technical or 
ethical– role of some sciences. Yet, while keeping in mind other purposes, he viewed causal 
explanation as the most important.  
Modern criticism of the reality of final causes, especially in the natural and biological realms, 
has a very long history: defending final causes has been considered an anthropomorphist 
position. Even some Aristotelians have thus reduced the final cause to efficient, material or 
formal causes. They were criticized on both literal and philosophical grounds.5 In the human 
realm, the reality of final causes, as different from all other causes, proves more evident than 
in natural sciences. As Johnson (2005, p. 211) asserts, “teleological explanations [based on 
final causes] play a special role in the case of humans, because here we are dealing with a kind 
of living thing capable of deliberate and intentional action in pursuit of ends.”6 Human beings 
also generalize and institutionalize ends: ends do not only pertain to individuals, but also to 
societies and all kind of communities.  
Aristotle writes in Nicomachean Ethics (VI, 2, 1139a32-36),    
The principle of action –the source of motion, and not the goal [that for the sake of 
which]– is decision [choice]; the principle of decision is desire and goal-directed 
reason [reasoning for the sake of something]. That is why decision requires 
understanding and thought [nou kai dianoias], and also a state of character;7  
In other words, practical reason shows the end, which is the final cause, and will decides, thus 
acting as efficient cause; there is something (a final cause) desired or willed thus driving this 
choice, which is the efficient cause of action.8 It is important to keep these two causes –final 
and efficient– separate because, in Aristotle’s indeterminist world, this real distinction 
guarantees freedom.9  
                                                 
5 For example, Johnson (2005, pp. 182-7) mentions and criticizes the “heuristic” interpretation posited 
by Theodor Gomperz, Jean Marie Le Blond, Wolfgang Wieland, Allan Gotthelf, and John Cooper. Rich 
Cameron (2003 and 2010) also mentions Wieland, Martha Nussbaum and Richard Sorabji as “elimina-
tivists”. Cameron regards the following Aristotelian scholars as “reductionists”: David Balme, Fred Mil-
ler, and Mohan Matthen (reduction to material cause), David Charles and John Cooper (formal cause), 
as well as David Furley and Terence Irwin (efficient cause; both them also mentioned in this sense by 
Natali 1999).   
6 However, this does not mean that natural teleology is of a “second class”. As Charlotte Witt empha-
sizes, Aristotle maintains a “unified theory of causal powers”: “without the teleological thread, it is un-
clear on what basis it makes sense to extend a realist theory of causal powers from natural causation 
to human activity” (2008, p. 137).  
7 I used Irwin’s translation and added under brackets some terms used in Ross’ translation. 
8 Cf. Aquinas [1964], n. 1133, p. 311 and [1949], p. 409: “intellectus movet voluntatem per modum quo 
finis movere dicitur, in quantum scilicet praeconcipit rationem finis, et eam voluntati proponit. Sed 
movere pero modum causae agentis est voluntatis, et non intellectus”.  
9 In Crespo (2013a, pp. 23-25) I distinguish in Aristotle: 1. “Ontological” indeterminism: necessity in 
nature is not absolute but hypothetical. The essential causes of things and events (material, formal) 
might not act. They are like Anscombe’s non-necessitating causes, or causes “that can fail of [their] ef-
fect without the intervention of anything to frustrate it” (1971: 101). 2. “Accidental” indeterminism: 
luck (týche) and spontaneity (automáto) (Metaphysics XII, 3, and VII, 7). Both terms express an event 
that results from coincidence (Physics II, 8). But, it does not rule out causality; however, causes are 
“indefinite” (Physics II, 5).  
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For humans, ends adopt a normative character, because, in spite of the existence of naturally 
appropriate human ends (the ergon’s argument), as for all natural realities (inanimate or 
animate), humans do not “automatically” pursue these ends: we are akratic and free. 
Normativity does not only apply to individuals but also to societies.  Aristotle writes against 
Plato in Eudemian Ethics (I, 8, 1218b 7-16 –Johnson’s translation: 2005, p. 217), 
The good itself that we are seeking is neither the idea of good nor the good as 
universal; for the idea is unchanging and not practical, and the universal, though 
changing, is still not practical. But for the sake of which, as an end, is best, and a 
cause of everything under it, and first of all goods. This would be the good itself, the 
end of human actions. And this is the good under the master art of all. And this is 
politics, economics, and prudence.   
This presentation of Aristotle’s notions on causality and explanation supports the explanation 
levels mentioned in the introduction.  For Aristotle, today’s statistical work would serve as a 
first step in the induction process –for him, induction (epagoge) is more than present-day 
induction, because it captures the essence or causes.10 The second level, causal explanation, 
pertains to efficient causes, but, when there is a final cause, the explanation picking up this 
cause –the third level– will be prior and more complete. In the human field, the end is the 
good (see, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics, I, 1) which is discerned by practical reason. Finally, the 
human realm also calls for a last level: the normative teleological explanation. It is time to 
look at contemporary conceptions of causality and explanation from the point of view of this 
Aristotelian framework.  
 
2. Causality and Teleology Today  
The Aristotelian tradition of cause-based scientific explanation lasted many centuries. Nancy 
Cartwright (1992, pp. 47ff.) even sustains that, in spite of some modern thinkers’ attack 
against the possibility of knowing real causality, current science continues to rely on causes 
for explanations (or ‘natures’ or ‘powers’, in Cartwright’s 1992 terminology). Cartwright also 
uses the term ‘capacities’, defining them as real, stable causes and viewing them as the actual 
springs of events that must be discovered. Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo and Jon 
Williamson also assert that, in fact, despite modern critiques on causality, scientists have 
always looked for causes (2011, p. 3):  
Causality never really went away: scientists’ claims were always intended to 
inform policy, experiment and technology, and such applications require 
causation, rather than mere association which tells us nothing about what 
happens when we intervene to change the world. 
Final causes are no exception. Regardless of the mentioned criticism, they are present in 
scientific explanation, especially in some disciplines like biology and human sciences. 
Moreover, the current literature on teleology is vast. Starting in the 1960s, teleology has been 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Physical indeterminism is indispensable for human freedom. However, as Anscombe asserts, “the 
physically undetermined is not thereby ’free’. For freedom at least involves the power of acting accord-
ing to an idea”, and this goes beyond mere non-predetermination of an indeterministic physics (1971: 
102). Rational powers “produce both the contrary effects” (Metaphysics 1046b).  
10 J. Hintikka (1992: 34) explains the difference very well: “For Aristotle, the problem of in-
duction was not first and foremost a problem of inference from particulars to a generalization. 
It was a problem of concept formation. Particular cases were stepping-stones to the concepts 
or forms ‘induced’ to be realized in the soul […] Hence, there is no such [Humean] problem as 
the justification of induction for Aristotle.” 
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applied to a number of fields. The emergent problem is described by Mark Perlman (2004, pp. 
46-47): 
There is still not a unified philosophical approach to functions and teleology –the 
topic of functions crosses from biological functions to the functions of artifacts, 
and affects such diverse areas as biology, psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, 
medicine (causes or origins of disease), sociology, anthropology (and 
archaeology), artificial intelligence, engineering sciences, ancient and medieval 
philosophy (especially Aristotle), philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, 
philosophy of language, metaphysics, and even phenomenology. It is no wonder 
things are still in a state of flux. But there is great excitement that modern 
teleology, properly naturalized, can explain things which have thus far resisted 
adequate explanation.  
However, though widely used in science, modern philosophers’ notions on cause and 
teleology differ from Aristotle’s. When Aristotle speaks about causality, he doesn’t mean the 
same as modern thinkers. He views causes primarily as internal principles of substance 
constitution and, only derivatively, as those principles’ subsequent active role.11 This also 
applies to the final cause, as Aristotle asserts: “For natural things are those which do move 
continuously, in virtue of a principle inherent in themselves, towards a determined goal” 
(Physics 2, 8, 199b 15-17). Instead, modern thinkers regard causality as a relation between 
two events –cause and effect– emphasizing the efficient role of causes.12 As Werner 
Heisenberg (1962, p. 40) argues, “only the causa efficiens approximately corresponds to that 
we today designate by the term cause.” As a result of this reduction, the term “cause” today 
usually means only the efficient cause, at most. When a final cause is considered, other 
expressions are used –for example, reasons or “functions”– to refer to something like it, but 
not the same, as I will explain. Additionally, the debate on causality has shifted from its 
metaphysical scope to its epistemological and methodological aspects, drawing away from 
ontological concerns about its existence and nature.  
In line with modern reductionist views on causality, most of the literature on functions or 
teleology largely tends to do away with final causes or to reduce them to efficient causes, also 
narrowing teleological explanations down to “causal” explanations (in the restricted modern 
sense of the term, i.e., by efficient causes). The legitimacy of teleological explanations becomes 
dependent on their reducibility to claims about causal systems (Turner, p. 30).  
According to Bigelow and Pargetter (1987 and 1990, pp. 325-333), three main currents follow 
this trend, diluting “functions” into the modern causal framework.13 First, “eliminativism” 
does not view functions as genuine existing properties of a thing or character, but merely as 
future effects that we can specify and talk about. These authors mention Robert Cummins 
(1975) as an example of this position (also noted as eliminativist by Cameron 2003, p. 164, 
but see Perlman 2004, pp. 12-15), with his rejection of teleology clearly revealed in his “Neo-
Teleology” (2002). David Buller (1999, p. 14) remarks: 
Cummins’ analysis of the concept of function makes the function of an item merely 
its causal contribution to a complex process. While this certainly succeeds in 
avoiding appeals to anything other than efficient causation, it does so at the cost of 
empting the concept of function of all its teleological content.  
                                                 
11 On the contemporary rebirth of the belief on the internal character of causal powers, see the papers 
collected in Grof 2008, Marmodoro 2010, Handfield 2009, and Mumford and Anjum 2011. These views 
rely on Aristotle’s notions on causality.  
12 See e. g., Psillos (2004), p. 280.  
13 See also Perlman’s taxonomy of teleological theories (2004, pp. 5ff.). For the aim of this paper I pre-
fer to use the simpler taxonomy of Bigelow and Pargetter, adding some information from Perlman.  
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Perlman (2004, p. 12) adds Daniel Dennett and the Churchlands (Paul and Patricia) to the list 
of eliminativists.  
Second, Bigelow and Pargetter refer to “representational” theories, especially applicable to 
the attribution of functions to artifacts. According to these theories, we can speak of functions 
when there is a plan, previous to the existence of a character and its future effects, referring to 
these effects. They mention Andrew Woodfield’s Teleology (1976) as illustrating this stance.  
Finally, “etiological” theories uphold that functions are causes (in the modern sense): 
teleological behaviors have been evolutionarily selected because they have been historically 
successful. The representative author mentioned is Larry Wright (1973). Perlman especially 
considers Ruth Millikan (1984). As David Buller (p. 12) explains, “Wright’s analysis takes the 
fact that y is an effect of x to be among the (antecedent) efficient causes of x, and thus provides 
an efficient causal explanation of the existence of x in terms of its producing y.”  
After criticizing these positions, Bigelow and Pargetter provide theirs, relying on a 
“propensity theory” (1990, pp. 333-341) to show how and why “Aristotle’s final causes have a 
place in science, both in culture and in nature” (1990, p. 341). They make functions “forward-
looking” by considering them as dispositions (see Perlman 2004, p. 21).  
Thomas Nagel has recently analyzed biological evolutionism, offering three possible 
explanations for the emergence of conscious organisms in the universe: the efficient causal, 
natural teleological, and intentional explanations. He provides arguments, as it were almost 
an inference to the best explanation, for the second, citing “natural teleological laws governing 
the development of organization over time, in addition to the familiar kind governing the 
behavior of the elements” (2012, p. 66). Then, it seems that he avoids the reductionism of the 
final cause to the efficient cause.  
Regardless of their differences, the following currents and authors that I include under the 
rubric of “organizational teleology” seem to be other exceptions to this reductionism of the 
final to the efficient cause. Evan Thompson (2004) narrates how Francisco Varela –who had 
developed together with Humberto Maturana the autopoiesis system approach to biological 
life– in his 2002 paper with Andreas Weber (Weber and Varela 2002) recognized that 
teleology is involved in this process: organisms are concerned with their own being and 
preservation. Some philosophical antecedents of these positions are the works of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty on the human body and of Hans Jonas on the living organism.14  
Specifically, David Witherington (2011 and forthcoming), basing his organismic-contextualist 
dynamic system perspective on the previous authors and their ideas, but also in von 
Bertalanfy’s systems theory, assign a fundamental role in the process of self-organization to 
the Aristotelian formal and final causes avoiding any reduction to the efficient and material 
causes. I quote from him: 
Unlike the temporal antecedent or propelling force explanations captured through 
efficient cause, formal and final causes –[…]– are atemporal, organizational levels 
of explanation that lend meaning to the temporal cause-effect sequences of 
efficient cause [(…)]. Whereas efficient cause necessarily presupposes a temporal 
context, formal and final explanations invoke abstraction itself as a means of 
partial explanation […]. Formal explanations abstract a pattern –a form, structure, 
organization– from the phenomenon, and that pattern functions as a partial 
explanation for the phenomenon. Final explanations abstract a function, future- 
end or purpose from the particular, real-time dynamic content of a phenomenon 
                                                 
14 More recent elaborations following this thread of thought are, for example, Di Paolo 2005, Mossio, 
Saborido and Moreno 2009, and Di Paolo and Thompson 2014.  
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to explain the phenomenon […] Whereas efficient causes serves to contextualize –
in bottom-up fashion– our understanding of an organism’s specific activity in 
terms of the events and conditions that temporarily and regularly precede that 
activity, formal and final explanations are not meant tom identify the antecedent 
circumstances for such activity or to account for its variable content. Instead, 
formal and final explanations serve to contextualize –in top-down fashion– our 
understanding of an organism’s specific activity in terms of the organization and 
directional purpose which that activity evinces as a whole (forthcoming, p. 70).  
He speaks of a circular causation process in which the four Aristotelian causes have their role 
both in the process and in its explanation, according to “Aristotle’s explanatory pluralism” (p. 
70) and causal pluralism (2011, p. 73). Abstract does not mean unreal. Modern science 
tendency, he adds, is to reify the abstract structures and functional causes provided by formal 
and final causes. Structures and goals thus become concrete entities that are viewed as 
directly efficiently causing the specific organism’s performance: “such structural reification 
allows for formal and final cause to be set up as a straw men and summarily rejected since 
abstractions cannot possibly operate in this fashion” (2011, p. 74). The possibility of 
recognizing formal and final causes entails acknowledging the real existence of the entities 
abstracted, something alien to a positivistic mentality, as that of the modern science. 
However, this recognition is important to understand the whole process:  
formal and final causes […] provide an abstract explanatory framework within 
which specific actions in specific contexts can be systematically organized and 
examined […] In effect, efficient causality becomes meaningful only in the 
presence of formal and final cause via the organizational complexity that 
characterizes the system qua system (2011, p. 75).  
Structure and goals provoke a “downward causation” electing and guiding the action of a 
“bottom-up causation” of the efficient cause on the material cause. In the same vein Sarah 
Waterlow explains: “for Aristotle the concept of ‘end’ provides not an additional explanation, 
nor one that can eventually be dispensed with, but the only explanation of something 
additional (to the materials) in the phenomenon to be explained” (italics in the original, 1988, 
p. 71). The explanation by the material and efficient causes is not enough because we need to 
know the final cause –intrinsically related to the formal cause– which functions as the 
criterion for the action of the former causes. Both inanimate and living things are organized in 
a special manner determined by their structure and subsequently by their end. Without this 
order that orients them they could behave in whatever way. As Johnson (2005, p. 187) states, 
“the material and moving factors have a role to play only in the context of a teleological 
explanation”.  
In the human field, where things seem to be clear and where, thus, a recognition of final 
causes might be expected, the reductionist position also prevails.15 G. H. von Wright (1971, p. 
16) refers to this stance as “the ‘causalist’ account of purposefulness”, naming some respected 
causalist authors (see also pp. 28 and 181 –note 80). Donald Davidson (1963) is a 
paradigmatic example, as he believes reason-based explanations must adopt the form of 
causal explanations. He upholds the thesis that the primary reason for an action is its cause 
(always in the modern sense, 1963, p. 686): a patent reduction of the final cause to the 
efficient cause. This position has had vast influence. For instance, after considering Aristotle’s 
four kinds of causes, John Searle asserts (2001, p. 41, italics in the original):  
                                                 
15 As von Wright argues, “the attitude toward finalistic explanations, i.e. towards attempts to account 
for facts in terms of intentions, goals, purposes, is either to reject them as unscientific or to try to show 
that they can, when duly purified of ‘animist’ or ‘vitalist’ remains, be transformed into causal explana-
tions” (1971, p. 4).  
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There is only one kind of causation, and it is efficient causation. However, within 
efficient causation, there is an important subcategory having to do with mental 
causation. […] And within the category of mental causation, there is yet another 
subcategory, that of intentional causation. 
Davidson’s reductionist view has been challenged. G. F. Schueler (2003, see especially 
chapters 1 and 3) presents a comprehensive criticism (see also Sehon 2005, Chapter 6 and pp. 
156-160), including J. L. Mackie’s (1974, pp. 274-5) genuinely teleological assertions and 
concluding that “there might be causes of an irreducibly teleological sort, different from other, 
efficient, causes” (2003, p. 20). Sehon shows how teleological and causal explanations support 
different counterfactuals, thus suggesting that teleological explanations are not reducible to 
causal explanations (2005, pp. 157-160). Von Wright is clearly against considering the will or 
intention as a Humean cause of action (see 1971, pp. 93-95), quoting Charles Taylor (1964, p. 
33) to share his view. Natali (1999, p. 54) maintains that to say that the final cause is an 
aspect of or is included in the efficient cause because the end is present in the motor as a 
desired object, and without end we do not have action, is like saying that the son is an aspect 
of the father because the latter cannot be father if he does not have children.  
There are other exceptions to the reductionist thrust, especially in the social field, where 
Raymond Boudon and François Bourricaud seem to be one such exception. They state:  
A teleological explanation for a phenomenon is therefore one which is based in 
explaining it through the goal aimed at by an individual, a group, or a system […] 
many social phenomena can clearly be properly analyzed only if actors’ final ends 
are taken into account (1989, p. 405).  
Austrian School economists belong to a tradition different from the authors just mentioned. 
However, they hold a teleological view of human action. Ludwig con Mises, starts his Human 
Action stating that “human action is purposeful behavior. Or we may say: Action is will put 
into operation and transformed into agency, is aiming at ends and goals” ([1949] 1998, p. 11). 
He then asserts that “society is concerted action. Society is the outcome of conscious and 
purposeful behavior” (id., p. 143). Although avoiding using the term “teleological” for its 
“socialist” implications, Friedrich von Hayek stresses the subjective and intentional character 
of human action. He exclaims “that the objects of economic activity cannot be defined in 
objective terms but only with reference to a human purpose goes without saying” ([1952] 
1979, pp. 52-53). He adds that this is the case not only for economics, but for “all the 
disciplines which deal with the results of conscious human action” (id, p. 57). He thinks that 
we must start from the understanding of human intentions to discover some patterns of social 
relations.  
Psychologists Brent Slife and Richard Williams also adhere to a genuinely Aristotelian view 
when they argue that “[t]eleologists hold that intentions and purposes are the causes of the 
actions that accompany them; they do not result from an efficient causal chain of events that 
precede them” (1995, p. 115). This does not imply that efficient cause explanations are not 
useful –they are, and, in most cases, they suffice as an explanation, but they provide a partial 
explanation: they explain “how” but not “why”. Von Wright wonders whether there is room 
for causal explanations in social sciences and comes to the conclusion that there certainly is –
but in a specific and subordinated place (1971, p. 135).  
For example, rational choice theory (RCT) assumes that individuals are purposive and have 
preferences; however, it does not analyze the content of these preferences (a teleological 
analysis), not even the cognitive process involved. It only requires consistency of choices.16 In 
other words, the only form of rationality considered by RCT is instrumental, but reasons or 
                                                 
16 On the limitations of RCT, see Reiss 2013, Chapter 3.  
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final causes are crucial in the human realm, and, thus, an axiological rationality (which is 
teleological) approach is required. Inquiring about final causes completes the understanding 
of phenomena. To open the black box of preferences includes knowing the “why” or reasons of 
them;17 it is necessary to get to an ultimate cause –i.e., “an unmoved mover that explains 
outcomes” (Mahoney 2003, p. 5).18 If this ultimate cause is not unearthed, “the result is an 
absence of theoretical integration, which in turn contributes to fragmentation in the social 
sciences” (id, p. 3). Boudon (1998, p. 172) elaborates, 
‘Explaining’ means ‘finding the causes.’ Explaining a social phenomenon means 
identifying its cause(s). In most cases, the explanation takes the form of a more or 
less complicated set of causal statements. The relations between the elements of 
the set can be more or less complex; they can be linear, recursive, include feedback 
loops, and so on. The set is what we usually call a ‘social mechanism’ (SM). A SM is, 
in other words, the well-articulated set of causes responsible for a given social 
phenomenon. With the exception of typical simple ones, SMs tend to be 
idiosyncratic and singular.  
However, he proposes a general framework –broader than RCT– to analyze social phenomena, 
as “action should be analyzed as grounded on reasons” (id., p. 174). If this is so, we then need 
a framework that includes not only the means-end rationality (instrumental) but also the end 
rationality itself: “Social actors can have strong reasons to endorse normative beliefs, without 
these reasons being of the cost-benefit type, and more generally, without these reasons being 
of the ‘consequential’ type” (id., p. 188). Boudon argues that actions, decisions and beliefs are 
meaningful to agents, in the sense that these elements are grounded on reasons, concluding 
that “rationality is not exclusively instrumental” (id., p. 199). He considers axiological and 
cognitive dimensions of rationality as well as the role of “irrationality” in human actions: 
“´traditional’ and ‘affective’ actions also exist. Moreover, all actions rest on a ground of 
instincts” (id., p. 200; see also 1999 and 2009). The social mechanism thus includes final and 
efficient causes.19 Justin Garson (2013) has recently highlighted “the functional sense of 
mechanisms.”20 Mechanisms, he states, serve functions, and the functional sense of 
mechanisms is ubiquitous (in biology, biomedicine and psychology) and useful: “it yields 
valuable epistemic benefits for researchers” (2013, p. 318). It is also interesting to note that 
Garson asserts that “conjoining the functional sense of mechanism with some version of the 
CR [causal role] theory is to effectively renounce the epistemic benefit of the functional sense 
of mechanism” (2013, p. 319). He mentions Cummins (1975), among others. In addition, I 
think that von Wright is lucid when he asserts that “it is thanks to its teleological background 
that the mechanism of making agents do things becomes operative” –this regardless of the 
                                                 
17 Behavioral economics does (or might do) this. Neuroeconomics also opens the “black box” but most-
ly providing a type of reductionist materialist explanation in which there is no place for final causes.  
18 For Aristotle the unmoved moving cause (final cause) of human action is the practical good (On the 
Soul II, 11, 433b 17). 
19 Johnson 2013 explains the compatibility of Aristotelian teleological explanations with mechanistic 
explanations. Alvin Goldman (1969) has held “the compatibility of mechanism and purpose”, albeit on 
the basis of the possibility of “simultaneous nomic equivalents”. As I understand it, this proposal actu-
ally implies the consideration of purposes as efficient causes. He opposes his view to Norman Mal-
com’s (1968), who finds a mechanism inconceivable because it is incompatible with a reason-based 
explanation of actions. The problem seems to lie on taking for granted a physicalist conception of 
mechanisms, in which all causes and explanations are reduced to physical causes and explanations. 
Admitting the metaphysical character of causes and the existence of final causes would enable this 
compatibility. A related discussion revolves around the compatibility (or lack thereof) of causal de-
terminism and free will –on this, see the essays in O’Connor (1995).  
20 My gratitude goes to H. Hasrum, who sent me this paper.  
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fact that “the teleological background can be more or less remote from the individual case in 
which the mechanism operates” (1971, pp. 149-150).  
Mario Bunge (1997: 413) asserts:  
To be sure, some human actions are purposive, but indicating their (known or 
conjectured) purpose, function, or usefulness performs only part of the job. We 
also need to know (or guess) something about the mechanism(s) likely to bring 
about the desired goal. 
Then, we have a purpose –the desired end, which is a final cause– and a specific mechanism to 
achieve this end –an efficient cause, which starts, as Aristotle points out, with a choice. 
Consider also the following passages in Cartwright:  
In building the machine, we compose causes to produce the targeted effect (1999, 
p. 65). […] you give me a component with a special feature and a desired outcome, 
and I will design you a machine where the first is followed by the second with total 
reliability (1999, p. 72). … [W]e always need a machine […] to get laws – […]. 
Sometimes God supplies the arrangements –as in the planetary systems– but very 
often we must supply them ourselves, in courtrooms and churches, institutions 
and factories (1999, p. 122).  
Again, we find the “desired outcome” and the machine. We may have a desired outcome and 
still lack the designed machine or the decision to act. We often witness this situation: freedom, 
akrasia, forgetfulness, a change of heart, or other impediments might come into play. This is 
why final and efficient causes are different. Searle (2001, pp. 13-15 and 50-51) speaks about 
three gaps between the reasons to act and the actual action: first, between the reasons [final 
causes] and the decision; second, between the decision and the action; and, finally, between 
the initiation of the action and its continuation to completion: “This gap,” he asserts (2001, p. 
13), “has a traditional name. It is called ‘freedom of the will’.” We may have the goal of losing 
weight (as an individual), or downsizing a firm (at the corporate level), or addressing climate 
change (at the level of society), but we all know how difficult may be to implement these 
goals. The “abstract goal” or final cause orients the election and action of specific means or 
efficient causes. Efficient causes, as Peter Geach (1975, p. 93) notes, cannot be even described 
without the idea of tendency, a teleological notion; we cannot account for an agent 
characteristic behavior, unless describing it as acting in order that something may happen.  
Among practical reason supporters, many share these kinds of teleological perspectives. For 
them, the ultimate spring of action is a reasoned target, different from the immediate efficient 
cause. For example, Bent Flyvbjerg’s proposal of a “phronetic social science” (see, e.g., 2001) 
has had significant impact. “Phronetic social scientists” maintain that social sciences are 
better at producing “intimate knowledge of localized understandings of subjective human 
relationships” (Schram 2012: 17). This is practical reason, context-dependent, practice-
focused knowledge, and its method is mixed. 
Over the past 30 years, experimental and behavioral economics have unveiled a lot of 
“anomalies” in human behaviors. However, these anomalies pertain to a narrow rationality 
notion. As mentioned, RCT (and Expected Utility Theory –EUT– as well) continues to focus on 
efficient causal explanations, considering only instrumental maximizing rationality –an 
adaptation of means (efficient causes) to given ends– without delving into the content of the 
latter. The ends are final causes, and their rationality is practical (“axiological” –for Boudon– 
“phronetic” –for Flyvbjerg). Ends are especially labile, idiosyncratic and singular –as the ad 
goes, ‘every individual is a world’ (this is why ends are difficult to be known and managed, 
and are thus usually cast aside by social researchers). Yet, this does not mean that they are 
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not rational. We may call them “reasonable”, given the strong reductivist connotation carried 
today by the word “rational”.  
In short, currently not all the teleological explanations, even in the human realm, are 
genuinely teleological in the sense of Aristotle’s final cause. While explanations based on final 
causes are the primary and more complete explanations,21 they have been systematically 
excluded in economics, which considers ends as given and requiring no explanation. This 
exclusion is the reason why economists do not understand many human behaviors, regarding 
them as irrational, instead of looking for their logic or rationale. Still, there are conceptions of 
economics that make room for teleological explanations, as discussed below.  
 
3. Analysis Levels in Economics 
It is not easy to find economists with an ample view of their discipline. Defining the economy 
or economics is not a task at which economics has excelled (see Backhouse and Medema 
2009; my paper 2013b). Scattered definitions are usually partial. I consider that one 
exception is the comprehensive notion of political economy provided by Austrian School 
Founder Carl Menger, who makes a distinction among: 
- “The historical sciences (history) and the statistics of economy, which have the task of 
investigating and describing the individual nature and the individual connection of 
economic phenomena” ([1883] 1985, pp. 38-9; see also Appendix IV, pp. 206-13; all 
italics in the original text).  
- Theoretical economics, aiming at discovering the general nature and connection of 
economic phenomena (cf. Ibid.). 
- Practical sciences of national economy, aiming at stating basic principles of action (cf. 
Ibid.) with a normative purpose (id., p. 99).  
Menger concludes, “By political economy, however, we will understand that totality of the 
theoretical-practical sciences of national economy” (id, pp. 39-40). It is a theoretical-practical 
science (id., p. 97).  
History and statistics describe and classify developments, but “uncritical compilations, or 
merely superficial arrangements of statistical material lacking higher unity do not come 
within the domain of scientific description” (id., p. 38). Theoretical economics, instead, looks 
for “a deeper understanding”, “extending beyond immediate observation” (id., p. 36; see also 
55). Theoretical economics seeks causal explanations: “scire est per causas scire” (id., p. 93). 
We need to know the “genetic element” (id., p. 94) –the efficient cause. However, Menger goes 
further: “[t]he goal of scholarly research is not only the cognition, but also the understanding 
of phenomena” (id., p. 43, always Menger’s italics). “We understand it [a phenomenon] when 
we have recognized the reason for its existence and for its characteristic quality (the reason 
for its being and for its being as it is)” (ibid.) –the final cause.22 Indeed, while the theoretical 
branch does not explicitly consider this, Menger does “admit quite unreservedly that real 
human phenomena are not strictly typical” (id., p. 214). The reasons for this are human 
beings’ free will and error (cf. id., p. 214): “volition, error, and other influences can, on the 
contrary, and actually do, bring it about that human agents take different roads from a strictly 
set starting point to a just as strictly determined goal of their action” (id., p. 217). Reasons 
associated with human intentions and goals deviate theoretically determined behaviors from 
                                                 
21 This paper does not analyze the differences between teleological explanations at individual and so-
cial levels. The social level clearly involves a more difficult task and a more complex methodology.  
22 Here, I will not delve into Menger’s proposed distinction between theoretical economics’ empirical-
realistic and exact orientations, their characterizations and their problems. I am only picking up some 
of his general ideas that pertain to my argument.  
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their intended direction. For Menger, both designed and unintentional social phenomena have 
to be analyzed on the basis of individual efforts, purposes, or unit functions (id., pp. 91, 129, 
133, 143, 159):  
[S]ome social phenomena are the result of a common will directed toward their 
establishment (agreement, positive legislation, etc.), while others are the 
unintended result of human efforts aimed at attaining essentially individual goals 
(the unintended results of these). In the first case social phenomena result from the 
common will directed toward their establishment (they are its intended products). 
In the second case social phenomena come about as the unintended result of 
individual human efforts (pursuing individual interests) without a common will 
directed toward their establishment.  
Thus, according to Menger, will, intention, goals, and interests are all final ends that explain 
social phenomena –and often induce deviations from typical conducts.  
Based on Menger’s classifications, we can go a step further to distinguish the following 
explanation levels of in social sciences, including economics:  
- 1. Statistics’ descriptive and classificatory level. 
- 2. The level of theoretical causal explanation, focusing on matching means and ends –part of 
Menger’s theoretical economics; it is the place of explanations by efficient causes.  
- 3. The teleological explanation level, seeking the reasons (final causes) for our actions –i.e., 
the rational explanation of preferences, also part of Menger’s theoretical economics.  
- 4. The level of normative principles dealing with preferences and the means to attain them.  
Levels 1 and 2 seem to require no additional clarifications, as they are standard statistics and 
standard economics, respectively. Concerning level 3, examples are provided by Sen’s 
capability approach and happiness economics. These two recent currents try to explain 
economic phenomena based on their ends or reasons –opportunities [“capabilities”] and 
happiness– and not by their efficient causes, which rely on immediate –rather than deep or 
ultimate– causes to explain phenomena. These may be construed as teleological perspectives, 
but, unfortunately, these new approaches are plagued by serious problems (for example, the 
lack of operational character of the capability approach and the doubtful character of 
happiness data and of the notion of happiness adopted –subjective well-being23). It is easy to 
manage RCT or EUT’s utility maximization of a set of consistent preferences as an end 
encompassing all ends, but this does not allow for an inner analysis of the actual motivations 
underlying human action.  
Finally, level 4 is implied in level 3, because, if ends are rational, we are consequently forced 
to look for them. As Hausman and McPherson (1996, p. 7; see also 29, 38ff.) argue, rationality 
is normative. Nicholas Rescher asserts,  
A narrowly construed ‘economic rationality’ based on unevaluated desires and 
mere preferences as such is rationality in name only; it can be altogether irrational. 
Rationality is a matter of appropriate alignment all along the line –not just choices 
with preferences but of preferences with evaluations and of evaluations with 
values. True rationality demands the pursuit of appropriate ends based on valid 
human interests, rather than that of unevaluated wants or preferences (1988: 
115).  
                                                 
23 For a criticism of this concept of happiness and proposal of a new construct (flourishing), see Crespo 
and Mesurado 2014.  
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Teleological explanations are normative: normative judgments prescribing actions underlie 
teleological explanations (see Mark Bedau 1992, Schueler 2003, Scott Sehon 1005, pp. 58-59 
and 2010). The evaluative nature of an end explains why we ought to act in order to attain it, 
and this applies not only to human action. Mark Bedau (1992, p. 48) explains, 
the theory of teleology appeals not to specifically ethical values but to goodness –
the idea that certain kinds on entities have interests (…) that are promoted by 
certain kind of states of affairs. For the plant, water is not right or just or fair but 
simply good; it makes it better off. 
Justin Garson applies the normativity of functions to mechanisms: “the normativity of 
function explains the normativity of mechanism” (2013, p. 325), adding that the former 
provides a very good explanation for the latter (2013, p. 326). Thus, level 3 is prior to 
level 2 in explanation.  
 
4. Conclusion  
The final cause has been considered as a natural gravitation towards a determinate 
ordination. The efficient cause would not produce a determinate effect if it not were oriented 
by a final cause. As a result, the modern reduction of final causes to efficient causes leaves 
things partially unexplained. Acknowledging the existence of final causes of things and events, 
especially in the human realm, paves the way to two often neglected explanation levels 
encompassing teleological and normative teleological explanations. By opening the black box 
of preferences in economics –as behavioral economics, the capability approach and happiness 
economics do– it is possible to reach a deeper explanation level for social phenomena, going 
beyond statistical and merely causal analyses. We expand our conception of rationality by 
adding practical reasonability to the narrow instrumental rationality, easing our way into a 
better, though more complex, understanding of human behaviors. This also justifies a 
normative, value-relevant social science. Values have been shunned from science but remain 
implicitly present. Leo Strauss warns of the perils of denying the links between values and 
facts in science (1959, p. 21):24  
It is impossible to study social phenomena, i.e., all important social phenomena, 
without making value judgments. [...] Generally speaking, it is impossible to 
understand thought or action or work without evaluating it. If we are unable to 
evaluate adequately, as we very frequently are, we have not yet succeeded in 
understanding adequately. The value judgments which are forbidden to enter 
through the front door of political science, sociology or economics, enter these 
disciplines through the back door. 
If these values are not rationally recognized and established, put over the table, ideology may 
take over. The Frankfurt School’s diagnosis of modernity –a critique of instrumental reason– 
seeks a role for practical reason. Max Horkheimer ([1967] 1974, p. 21), for example, argues 
that reason aims at much more than the mere task of regulating the relationship between 
means and ends: it intends to understand ends themselves.  
Value embeddedness entails a re-interpretation of the role of the value-free scientific 
requirement. Value-neutrality should not mean casting values aside but reasoning about them. 
Neutrality in social sciences’ selection of concepts can only be achieved by means of the 
scientific determination of standards for rational practical reasonableness (see Finnis 1982: 
12). That is, the way to manage the value-free ideal is not to push values away but rather to 
                                                 
24 There is an ample bibliography on this entanglement. See, for example, Putnam (2002) and Taylor 
(1985).  
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reason about them, rationally determining which should be pursued. This is the task of practical 
science. Once the values contained in final causes are recognized, we naturally move from the 
“is-propositions” to the “ought-propositions” –the last level of social science.  
Reconsidering final causes in explanation is a source of hope, the hope of better explaining 
and also orienting human action. 
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